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Abstract: Extracting the value from big data assets is one of the goals the European Commission set 
in the Europe 2020 Initiative. However, a number of influential voices from the academia as well as 
from the practice have been suggesting that the current European regulation may not adequately 
address the challenges of big data. This paper aims to identify existing legal barriers and enablers to 
big data reuse in the EU law based on the approach that follows the traditional dichotomy of laws. In 
the public law part we analyse data protection law, privacy law and human rights provisions, data 
retention law, data localisation law and cybersecurity law. On the private law side the relevant areas 
are intellectual property rights law, competition law and consumer protection law. We find that the 
EU regulatory landscape is highly complex when it comes to data reuse. Claiming that as a general 
proposition the EU law should be labelled as a barrier or as an enabler does not hold much water. 
Nevertheless, the most important barriers and enables are identified, which may be useful for 
further regulating data reuse in order to facilitate a sustainable and dynamic digital environment. 
Keywords: European Union, Big Data, Data Reuse, Legal Framework, Barriers, Enablers 
I. Introduction 
Despite of its buzzword status and wide usage in a variety of contexts, big data still has no well-
established definition. Most often, it is characterized by the variety of sources of data, the velocity at 
which they are collected and stored, and their sheer volume, commonly known as the “3-V 
definition”.3 It is not clear which size datasets need to have, to label it big data, but big data 
obviously deals with many terabytes and petabytes.4 The burning question, however, does not 
regard the definition of big data, but is how big data can create value, what its economic benefits are 
and how it can help the leading companies outperform their peers.5 Some of the world’s most 
successful and innovative companies such as Google, Facebook, Amazon, and eBay have built their 
business model on the collection and exploitation of big data.6 In a similar way that oil laid the 
foundation of the smokestack economy, big data is believed to become the lifeblood of the 
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information economy.7 It therefore comes as no surprise that extracting the value from data assets is 
one of the goals the European Commission (EC) set in the Europe 2020 Initiative.8 Value creation 
through big data reuse is seen as a big potential and a not-to-be-missed opportunity for the EU. 
The emergence of big data and its proven benefits have added to the complexity of the legal 
discussion, since the current regulation may not sufficiently respond to the challenges related to big 
data sets.9 On the one hand, there have been claims that our society should expect a substantial loss 
of benefits of big data, if it attempts to confine it within an obsolete legal framework.10 On the other 
hand, we cannot turn a blind eye on the grey side of big data revolution and its numerous risks.11 Big 
data reuse in particular is a complex and blurred legal concept that could be an increasing source of 
consumer detriment in terms of privacy, security and consumers’ rights.12  
In the EU law, reuse is defined in Article 2 of The Directive 2003/98/EC on the re-use of public sector 
information (PSI Directive) as the use by persons or legal entities of documents held by public sector 
bodies, for commercial or non-commercial purposes other than the initial purpose within the public 
task for which the documents were produced.13 Hence the scope of the PSI is on documents rather 
than on data. This definition only applies to public sector information and does not necessarily fit the 
private domain.  
Apart from the abovementioned provision, there has been no other European-wide definition of data 
reuse adopted yet. To understand the concept, we thus had to look at some other sources. Schneier 
defines data reuse simply as secondary use of data that follows initial collection and use. 14 However, 
even when this distinction is used for defining data reuse, it can be useful to split data reuse into 
more subcategories. For instance, an important legal distinction is whether data is reuse within the 
original purpose or beyond the original purpose (which is likely to constitute function creep). Another 
important distinction is whether the data is reused within its original context. Whether there is data 
repurposing and/or data recontextualisation depends on how and for which purposes the data is 
reused and on the conditions under which the data was originally collected.15  
Our paper has no ambition to provide a final definition of data reuse. Rather, data reuse is 
considered in open terms as an analytical framework for the legal analysis and includes any type of 
secondary use of data.  
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Whereas other papers often address big data issues from particular legal perspectives, such as data 
protection law or intellectual property law, the main purpose of this paper is to provide a more 
general overview of the entire EU legal framework for big data reuse and to identify the 
requirements that influence data reuse activities. The key outcome will be a high-level analysis of 
critical areas discussing a number of existing legal barriers and enablers. This analysis can serve the 
legal audience well as an overview of the complex regulatory landscape for data reuse for. Moreover, 
the identification of the most important barriers and enables may be useful for law-makers and 
policy-makers for further regulating data reuse in order to facilitate a sustainable and dynamic digital 
environment. 
In order to structure the analysis we distinguish two realms, private law and public law, following the 
traditional dichotomy of laws.16 Law that regulates the vertical relationship between the state and 
private parties shall be deemed public whereas law that applies to horizontal dealings among private 
parties shall be labelled private.17 Among the legal areas that prove relevant for data reuse, data 
protection law, intellectual property law and competition regulation are clearly in the front line, but, 
as will be shown, also other areas of law may be applicable to some extent.  
The selection of the areas of public law is limited to: data protection law18, privacy law and other 
human rights, data retention law, data localisation law and cybersecurity law. The selection of areas 
of private law is limited to: IPRs law, competition law and consumer protection law. We have 
acknowledged the EU’s endeavours in regulating data reuse in the public domain, which have been 
an indispensable part of the legal discussion on open data in Europe since early 2000s.19 In the 
private sector, however, considerably little and mostly partial analysis on data reuse has been 
performed yet, in spite of the EC’s appeal to understand open data in a broader sense, i.e., including 
the private sector’s initiatives.20 To fill that gap, this paper also focuses on the regulatory landscape 
for the private sector.  
Our contribution describes the first results of the EUDECO project,21 an EU funded project under the 
Research and Innovation Framework Program Horizon 2020 of the European Commission. In this 3-
year project, 6 partners from 5 countries work together on modelling the European data economy 
(EuDEco).22 The EuDEco project is focused on addressing the question of reusing data from economic, 
technological, social/ethical and legal perspectives.  
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This paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the notion of data reuse. Section III explains 
the approach we took to position data reuse within legal borders. Section IV and V assesses data 
reuse from the perspectives of the selected legal areas. Section VI provides conclusions. 
II. Public law overview 
1. Data protection rules 
Since a considerable and often the most valuable part of reused information relates to individual 
persons,23 personal data protection rules are highly significant for data reuse. It is thus sensible to 
begin with a short overview of data protection law. Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(DPD)24 adopted in 1995 has remained the fundamental European legal act in the area of data 
protection until today. The directive applies to processing of personal data, which means any 
operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic 
means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, 
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, 
alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction (Article 2(b) of the DPD). Although not 
mentioned explicitly, data reuse can be seen as part of the broadly defined processing activities. The 
scope of the directive is delineated in Article 2 (a) by defining personal data as any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject'), who can be identified, directly 
or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific 
to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity. The core provisions of the 
DPD are found in Article 6, and are commonly referred to as privacy principles. 
Due to the limited space, our short analysis of data protection law will only address three privacy 
principles that seem directly relevant to data reuse. We will base the analysis on the current version 
of the EU data protection law set forth in the DPD, but we will also make some references to the 
proposed General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)25.  
The initial and critical point of every data processing is its lawfulness (Article 6(a)), which in turn 
means that a valid legal basis must be secured before each processing. The DPD recognizes the 
following five bases (Article 7): 
(a) the data subject’s unambiguous consent;  
(b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract; 
(c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject;  
(d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject; 
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(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the 
exercise of official authority;  
(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by 
the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where such interests are overridden 
by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.  
In cases of data reuse, many of the legal bases above will hardly be used in practice. For instance, it is 
difficult to imagine how data reuse could be a requirement to perform a contract (b). As Article 29 
Working party (WP) notices, Article 7(b) must be interpreted strictly and does not cover situations 
where the processing is not genuinely necessary for the performance of a contract.26 For example, 
the provision will not be a suitable legal ground for building a profile of the user’s tastes and lifestyle 
choices based on his clickstream on a website and the items purchased. This is because the data 
controller has not been contracted to carry out profiling, but rather to deliver particular goods and 
services.27 
Also, it is very unlikely that invoking a data subject’s vital interest (d) or a general public interest (e) 
would legitimate data reuse. Both provisions suggest that they have a limited application. First, the 
phrase ‘vital interest’ appears to limit the application of this ground to questions of life and death. 
Second, the ‘general public interest’ refers to public tasks that are assigned to an official authority or 
that are imposed on a private part by a public body.28   
Thus, consent (a) or a data controller’s legitimate interest (f) will probably be used as a legal basis. 
But even then, it will not always be easy for a commercial reuser to justify the processing. A valid 
secondary consent is difficult to receive, especially if some time has passed since the initial consent 
was gained. A legitimate interest of a commercial performer, probably closely related to its business 
goals, will suffice if it outweighs the importance of the right to data protection. As stressed by the 
researchers involved in the LAPSI project, data protection is considered a fundamental right; hence a 
data reuser might have a hard time proving that its interest wins over privacy.29  
The WP takes a more balanced approach. It states that when interpreting the scope of Article 7(f), it 
is necessary to ensure the flexibility for data controllers for situations, where there is no undue 
impact on data subjects. However, it is important that data subjects are provided with sufficient legal 
certainty and guarantees, which prevents misuses of this open-ended provision.30 
In addition to the notion of lawfulness, Article 6(a) also contains the principle of fairness, which is 
elaborated through the provision on the right to information in Article 10.31 Data subjects have to be 
provided with information about the processing in an intelligible form including the details of: 
purposes of processing, the categories of data concerned, the data undergoing processing, the 
recipients or categories of recipients to whom the data are disclosed, any available information 
                                                          
26
 Article 29 Working Party ‘Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 of 
Directive 95/46/EC’ (WP 217), p. 16. 
27
 Ibid., p. 17.  
28
 Ibid., pp. 20–21.  
29
 LAPSI, (2012) Policy Recommendation N. 4 Privacy and Personal Data Protection 
<http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1098>.  
30
 Supra, note 28, p. 10. 
31
 Edoardo Ustaran et al., European Privacy: Law and Practice for Data Protection Professionals (International Association of 
Privacy Professionals, 2012), p. 106. 
6 
 
about the source and logic involved in any automatic processing of data. Data controllers usually 
provide this information in their privacy policies or in their terms and conditions, but these are not 
always easy to understand.32  
In the context of data reuse, the fairness principle and the closely related right to information do not 
cease to apply. On the contrary, at this point it becomes even more important that the data subject 
is fully informed about the activities in which he is indirectly involved through his own data. There 
are two options how to ensure data subject’s awareness. First, data reuse activities that might 
happen in the future are described and communicated to the data subject before his personal data is 
collected. Second, the data subject renews his consent every time before the data is reused for a 
new purpose, based on the information communicated through the updated privacy policy. Both 
tactics prove difficult to apply. In the first case, it is hard to predict all the purposes for data reuse 
that may arise in the future. In the second case, it is almost impossible to get in touch with all data 
subjects and to secure their valid consent.33  
Conveying adequate information to an individual not only indicates fairness of processing, but it is an 
indispensable source of transparency and individual involvement. Only after receiving clear 
information the data subject is able to invoke his “core” rights such as right to access, erase and 
object.34 Informing a data subject about data reuse, establishes the right balance between the right 
of the individual to have control over his or her data and the flexibility required for businesses to 
develop and innovate and make best use of the vast amount of data generated online and offline. As 
pointed out by the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), the processing of big data can 
challenge the reasonable expectations of privacy that data subjects may have.35 An example would 
be the purchase of data from a social media provider by a data broker. Absent clear information on 
data reuse, a user may not be aware how his data is shared nor may he expect such a trade.36 
Finally, one of the most significant provisions for data reusers is the principle of purpose limitation 
and specification set forth in Article 6(b) of the DPD. It requires that the data is only used for a 
purpose compatible with the one for which it was collected. 
Controllers have to determine the purpose of processing before the processing of data starts.37 The 
chosen legal basis will only be valid for this specific purpose. For instance, consent will count as valid 
only for the cases of data use and reuse, which the controller communicated at the moment of the 
data collection.  
The principle of purpose limitation is thus seen as an onerous, though a necessary barrier to 
excessive data use, profiling and analytics. Given the increasing prevalence of these practices, it has 
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been suggested that data protection strives more for regulating the decision-making stage than for 
regulating the data collection and data processing stages.38  
Careful observance of the purpose limitation has been stressed by the European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS) as one of the key decisions of accountable organizations. Also, the EDPS 
emphasized the importance of the context in which data is reused. Reusers have to consider whether 
data initially used in one context can be legitimately used in another context.39  
In practice, it is unlikely that all possible reuses can be defined or predicted in advance. Admittedly, 
data reuse can be included in the purposes specified by the data controller by using a broad purpose 
formulation. Social networks’ data use policies typically lacks specificity, both with regard to the data 
the networks collect as well as with regard to how they use this data. For instance, Facebook’s 
privacy policy from 2015 only identifies categories of purposes by using vague descriptions such as 
“Provide, Improve and Develop Services”; “Promote Safety and Security”; “Show and Measure Ads 
and Services”).40 However, this can be seen as circumventing the intention of the legislator and 
processing based on it can be considered illegitimate.  
The proposed regulation on data protection seems to shed some light in that direction. The Council’s 
amendments have improved the provision on purpose limitation with a more detailed guidance for 
data reusers. In case of further processing the judgment on the compatibility of processing should be 
based on the following criteria: (a) links between the purposes for which the data have been 
collected and the purposes of the intended further processing; (b) the context in which the data have 
been collected; (c) the nature of the personal data; (d) the possible consequences of the intended 
further processing for data subjects; (e) the existence of appropriate safeguards.41 Another form of 
the compatibility assessment was proposed by Article 29 Working party in the Opinion on purpose 
limitation. The Party suggests a combination of a formal assessment, focused on the comparison 
between the purposes provided by the controller and actual data reuse and subjective assessment, 
focus on the context and the way the purposes can be understood, to determine the compatibility of 
data reuse.42 
2. Privacy law and other human rights provisions 
Data reusers increasingly seem to make use of aggregated, anonymized data. Anonymization is a 
process of turning data into a form, which does not allow the identification of an individual.43 Non-
identifiable data is no longer personal data; hence, data protection law does not apply anymore. 
Data reusers are particularly keen to adopt that technical solution when the legal regime for 
protection of personal data is considered too restrictive. Anonymized data can be as useful as 
personal data in many cases. A typical example may be a company that wants to personalize its 
marketing campaigns with the help of profiling. The use of personal data may be helpful to assess 
which people are potentially interested in particular products or services, but aggregated data on 
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street level or neighbourhood level may be similarly useful and cheaper to process, as there are no 
consent procedures required and no detailed selection procedures necessary.44  
Different degrees of anonymity exist. Anonymity exists when the identity of a data subject is not 
known and cannot be known. Pseudonymity exists when different transactions of one person can be 
linked to each other and to an specific entity without knowing the identity of this entity. An example 
may be a PIN code at an ATM: transactions can be related to the card, without knowing who made 
the actual transaction with the card. In line with the definition of personal data from Art. 2 of the 
DPD, data protection requirements also apply to pseudonymized data. Although Article 29 Working 
Party promotes pseudonymisation as a useful security tool, it emphasizes that by pseudonymisiation 
of data a data controller does not escape data protection requirements.45  
Since it has become clear that it is not possible to establish with absolute certainty that an individual 
cannot be identified from a particular dataset of anonymized data in combination with other data 
that may exist elsewhere,46 the EDPS has encouraged those who employ anonymization techniques 
to carefully use such techniques in combination with other safeguards. Anonymization cannot be 
achieved by just stripping a dataset of some directly identifying attributes but requires a much more 
prudent approach.47  
In the absence of data protection law applicability, the EU law still grants some protection to data 
subjects. The protection of private life as guaranteed in Article 7of the EU Charter, which is not 
limited to situations involving the processing of personal data but also covers spatial, physical and 
relational privacy, as well as some other provisions on fundamental rights, can offer some legal 
safeguards.48  
As indicated above, big data and its reuse may be useful for profiling purposes, but the results from 
profiling and other types of data analyses may turn out to be stigmatizing or discriminating. When 
selecting individuals or groups of people on particular characteristics, this may be unwanted or 
unjustified or both. Selecting for jobs, offering products and services to specific groups only, and 
some other decision-making is considered unethical and, in many countries, forbidden by (anti-
discrimination) law when it takes place on the basis of gender, ethnic background, etc. When risk 
profiles constructed by companies, governments or researchers become 'public knowledge', this may 
also lead to stigmatization of particular groups. Discrimination and stigmatization on a large scale 
may also result in polarization of (different groups of) society. 
Big data can even put pressure on human dignity. Solove49 argues that in our information society, the 
reputation of people is more and more constituted by the data that is disclosed about them. Such 
disclosure of personal data can be voluntary or involuntary. As a result, people are also increasingly 
judged upon their digital representation (the digital person) rather than human beings of flesh and 
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blood. Practices like profiling can reinforce a tendency to regard persons as mere objects.50 An 
example of a relationship based on digital reputation, trust and economic dependence is the sharing 
economy. According to a recent workshop at the FTC, the reputation could replace the regulation, if 
the sharing economy continues to grow in the future.51 This may be particularly problematic when 
characteristics of digital identities are incorrect or incomplete or when automated decisions (i.e., 
without further human interference) are made upon individuals based solely on their digital 
identity.52 A related issue is the so-called chilling effect, which refers to the fact that people may alter 
their behaviour when they are aware that they are being monitored. Sometimes, for instance in 
cases of camera surveillance, the aim is precisely to make people behave ‘better’, but a more general 
effect may be that people behave more modest and reluctant overall, reducing their freedom of 
expression and other important human rights and values.  
Finally, data reuse can even challenge liberty and justice. The lack of privacy in the data economy 
greatly increases the possibility of price discrimination and influences some basic postulates of the 
free market.53 
3. Data retention laws 
Contrary to the areas discussed above, data retention laws present an example of a regulation, which 
rather encourages than restricts data reuse. Namely, its main purpose is to ensure there is sufficient 
amount of telecom data available to law enforcement for later reuse, under strict conditions. While 
fighting crime is no doubt a valid argument for data collection and reuse, the example shows how 
human rights can be at stake.54 Moreover, the retention requirement imposes some significant 
administrative and financial burden to the communication providers, making it undesirable from the 
economic perspective. 
In 2006, the European Union issued the Data Retention Directive.55 This is perhaps the best known 
example of a data retention law. According to this directive, member states had to store the 
telecommunications data of citizens for a period of 6 to 24 months. Law enforcement agencies and 
security agencies were allowed to request a court access to the data for criminal investigations and 
prosecution. On April 8th 2014, however, the Court of Justice of the EU declared the directive invalid, 
because it violates fundamental rights. 
Data retention laws described above should not be confused with data retention requirements, 
mostly non-binding or imposed as self-regulation, that are part of industry-specific laws, codes of 
conduct or private agreements. Those requirements should be interpreted in line with the EU data 
protection regulations and should comply with the principles of data protection law, in particular 
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with the principle on data quality and on lawful processing (Article 6 para. 1 (a),(b) of the DPD).56 An 
example is the Code of Practice on Secondary Use of Medical Data in Scientific Research Projects, 
which provides that medical data is retained for a period of time that is needed to ensure 
reproducibility and verifiability of the findings.57 For pseudonymized and anonymized data the 
conditions are more lenient. Similarly, search engines’ providers follow the retention period as 
determined in their industry’s best practices. In the EU, Article 29 Working Party has advised them to 
limit the retention of personal data (search terms) to 6 months.58 In the world of increased data 
sharing, selling, licensing and other types of data reuse, data retention is desirable as it enables 
leveraging on the acquired data by performing indefinite data mining. Many commercial players will 
therefore be reluctant to delete the data they process and try to circumvent the legal provisions by 
drafting open and inexact data privacy policies.59  
4. Data localisation laws 
In the post-Snowden era, the idea of a transnational Internet where the information is freely moving 
cross-border has been challenged by a number of legislative proposals containing provisions on data 
localization. Those are data localization requirements, which refer to laws, or parts of laws, that limit 
the storage, movement and/or processing of data to specific geographies and jurisdictions or that 
limit the companies that can manage data based upon the company’s nation of incorporation or 
principal sites of operations and management.60 A striking number of countries have been moving 
closer to this paternalistic approach to cross-border data transfers by adopting various legislative 
measures with a common characteristic to encumber the cross-border data transfers.61 A significant 
example of data localisation has been Russia with its amended draft law On Personal Data and On 
Information, Information Technologies and Protection of Information stating all personal data of 
Russians to be collected and recorded on the servers in Russia.62 A number of other countries have 
also proposed data localisation laws: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Vietnam, South Korea, 
Kazakhstan, Taiwan and even some EU member states e.g. Germany and France.63  
The motives are very diverse. At the top of the list are placed fear of foreign surveillance, followed 
closely by privacy and security concerns, endeavours for better law enforcement and development of 
national economies.64  
By creating “Schengen zones for data” data localisation laws are undermining the possibility of global 
services as well as the major new advances in information technology.65 The implications of these 
regulations on cloud computing, Internet of Things and big data, where cross-border flow of 
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information and unlimited access to data is one of the main enablers, could be seen as a threat to the 
rising digital economy and effective (big) data reuse.  
5. Cybersecurity law 
The extent of data gathering, selling, and free dissemination of private derails, with few regulatory 
controls, opens many avenues for misuse.66 For example, exploitation of big data through adversaries 
might open doors to new type of attack vectors.67 The EU Commission plans to tackle some of these 
issues with a Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive, proposed in early 2013.68 The draft 
directive aims to improve the security of the Internet and the private networks and information 
systems underpinning the functioning of our societies and economies. 
The Commission acknowledges that the Data Protection Directive already contains a number of rules 
related to the security standards for controllers, including reusers, of personal data. However, there 
have been no rules relating to those that control, or reuse, non-personal data. For example, a 
network and information security breach affecting the provision of a service without compromising 
personal data (e.g. an ICT outage at a power company resulting in a blackout) would not have to be 
notified.69 The NIS directive fills that gap by requiring market operators to notify critical breaches to 
national authorities and to ensure an adequate level of security for their information assets (Article 
14, para. 1 and 2).  
III. Private laws overview 
1. Intellectual property law  
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) protect immaterial goods, which are mostly the product of a 
creative mental human activity in the industrial, scientific, literary and artistic fields.70 Among all the 
IPRs71, copyrights, database rights and trade secrets are most closely related to data. Patents can 
apply to computer implemented processes that manipulate and process data, but generally not in 
relation to data itself.72 Trademarks can apply to data products (like indices), but again, generally not 
in relation to the actual data.73 In line with this view, our analysis will focus on copyrights, the sui 
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generis database right and trade secrets as it could be argued that these are the legal concepts that 
might influence data reuse activities in the EU most heavily, from an IPRs perspective. 
Copyrights protect the form or expression of information but not the underlying information itself. 
They apply to software, certain databases, literary works, music, films, videos and broadcasts74 that 
own a certain degree of creativity (also originality), which EU law defines as ‘the author’s own 
intellectual creation’.75 Copyrights arise automatically by operation of law in the EU (so that no 
registration is required) and constitute a formal remedy that stops unauthorized copying.76  
Copyright is an important concern for data reusers. Any data analytics or data mining will often 
involve the wholesale copying of information or databases, many of which will be protected by IPRs 
in relevant jurisdictions.77 Where data is not owned or licensed by the reusers, they will either need 
to find a viable exception to copyright or to abstain from data reuse.78 However, it will not always be 
easy to determine who actually owns the data. The unambiguous ownership has been identified as a 
top-problem of open data use.79  
In the EU, there have been some vocal observations suggesting the copyright laws should be 
transformed to better fit the needs of the digital society and data driven economy.80 The EU 
Parliament has recently adopted a non-legislative report on copyright reform prepared by Pirate 
Party Member Julia Reda. The report calls for an adaptation of the EU 2001 Copyright Directive to the 
digital market and establishes the basis for the upcoming copyright reform proposal by the EU 
Commissioner for Digital Economy and Society.81 In December 2015 the Commission published the 
communication “Towards a modern, more European copyright framework”, in which it emphasizes 
the need for higher harmonisation and adaptation of copyright rules to new technological realities. 
Among others, the communication includes a proposal for a simplified cross-border access to online 
content services and the regulation of online platforms, in particular news aggregators.82 
Another concept that can play an important role in data reuse is the legal protection of databases. 
Countries have addressed the issue in an uncoordinated fashion using diverse legal mechanisms 
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ranging from unfair competition rules to technological protection measures.83 The European Union is 
an exception as it recognizes a unique right, exclusively aimed at the protection of databases, the so-
called sui generis right, set forth by Directive 96/9/EC. The goal is to protect the content of databases 
that is not protected under copyright or data protection laws, but that amounts to a substantial 
investment, in time or money, for the collecting, verifying and presentation of the data (not the 
creation of the data themselves). Since its adoption by means of the Database directive, the sui 
generis right has received much criticism, including some negative feedback from the CJEU. Although 
the Court limited the scope of the data base right in its judgement in Case C-203/02 The British 
Horseracing Board Ltd and Others v William Hill Organization Ltd84, sui generis right is still considered 
a barrier to data reusers. Hargeaves and Hugenholtz claim the right is especially obstructing data 
mining and Big Data analytics.85 Despite the critics, the database right is still fully applicable and data 
reusers should consider it carefully to avoid breaching IP law.   
Contrary to the US federal legal system86, there is no legislation on the EU level yet that would 
specifically concentrate on trade secrets.87 Member states chose to regulate that area either in their 
commercial laws or through the prohibition of unfair competition. The protection of trade secrets 
often conflicts data reusers’ goals, since it limits the access to datasets and reduce their 
exploitability.  
2. Competition law  
As a general proposition, competition law consists of rules that are intended to protect the process 
of competition in order to maximise consumer welfare.88 Competition law is concerned with 
practices that are harmful to the competitive process, in particular with anti-competitive 
agreements, abusive behaviour by a monopolist or a dominant firm, mergers and public restrictions 
of competition.89 Competition has gained central importance in the EU as one of the most powerful 
tools the authorities have to restore consumer’s welfare.90  
Competition law settles the conditions for a free and unrestricted access to market and this should 
also be the case on the market of (big, personal) data. National and EU competition authorities have 
over the last five or so years been showing increasing interest in analysing data through the lens of 
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competition law in a number of sectors,91 for example financial market data92, geospatial data93 and 
last but not least, personal data94.  
In the Google/DoubleClick case95 the EC analysed whether the mere combination of DoubleClick’s 
assets with Google’s assets, in particular the databases that both companies have or could develop 
based on customer online behaviour, could allow the merged entity to achieve a position that could 
not be replicated by its competitors.96 
The Commission also reviewed the case of a merger between TomTom/Tele Atlas.97 The business 
goal of that merger was to enable TomTom re-using (integrating) and selling the information 
acquired from the new business partner Tele Atlas (the merged company).98 Tomtom and TeleAtlas 
tried to defend the merger with an efficiency claim arguing that that data in the form of feedback 
from TomTom’s large customer base would allow the merged firm to produce better maps faster.  
In 2014 the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) hosted a workshop to collect best practices 
and offered some guidance on possible interfaces between data protection law, consumer law and 
competition law.99 The EDPS acknowledged that big data, which often contains personal information, 
plays the role of a currency for purchasing free services. For example, in the case of cross-sided 
platforms such as Facebook, data is easily (and freely) gained from the consumers on the one side of 
the market and then sold to advertisers on the other side.100 If one of the players on that market 
acquires a dominant position, this might result in unwilling consequences such as tying, 
anticompetitive agreements or exploitation of competitors.101 
The assessment of the merger between Facebook and WhatsApp, where the Commission checked 
whether post-merger Facebook would collect data from WhatsApp users (which are also Facebook 
users) and gain an advantage for targeted advertising, was, among others, concerned with the 
significance of personal data for the competition on the market. The Commission found no 
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competition concerns even if Facebook would use WhatsApp as a new source of user data, as there 
remain a sufficient alternative providers of online advertising services with access to user data 
valuable for advertising purposes.102 
When discussing if and how big data reuse should be subject to competition law, it is important that 
the authorities understand both the competitive benefits and risks of data-driven strategies.103 
Sometimes, a data-driven merger may provide sufficient scale for smaller rivals to effectively 
compete, however, at other times data may be used primarily as an entry barrier.104 Both, the 
Google/DoubleClick case and the TomTom/TeleAtlas case were cleared. Nevertheless, the fact that 
the lengthy and costly assessment procedure was initiated confirmed the seriousness of the 
concentration and the likelihood of the negative impact to competitiveness in the EU. Also, there has 
been no investigation related to an abuse of a dominant position on the market of big data or 
personal data on the EU level so far, but, as the Commission puts it clearly, this cannot be ruled 
out.105 The scenario, in which the finding of liability under Article 102 TFEU seems most likely, is 
where an access seeker needs the user data as an input for a new product that would not stand in 
direct competition to the main product that the online platform provider offers to its customers.106 
3. Consumer protection 
As the EU data protection supervisor (EDPS) made clear in his preliminary opinion,107 consumer 
protection law plays a visible role in the data-driven economy in particular in ensuring transparency 
and accuracy of information. The EDPS predicts that the scope for abuse of market dominance and 
harm to the consumer through refusal of access to personal information and opaque or misleading 
privacy policies may justify a new concept of consumer harm for competition enforcement in digital 
economy.108 
The UK regulator for markets and competition (CMA) has already embraced this position. In June 
2015 it published a comprehensive opinion on commercial use of consumer data109 listing a number 
of business practices that are arguably disputable under consumer protection law. For example, 
according to CMA misrepresenting the privacy, security, or confidentiality of users’ information – 
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which could still be deceptive, even if the privacy policy or other small print is factually correct (for 
example, the consumer is told that data is collected in order to complete a purchase) – violate the 
provision of fairness set down in the EU and UK national legislation.110  
Big data reusers are bound to comply with data protection law, but in reality they often walk on the 
edge of law. The fact that their behaviour is regulated by both data protection and consumer 
protection rules could mean an additional safeguard for data subjects and hopefully more 
transparency in data reuse. 
IV. Conclusions 
Extracting the value from data assets is one of the goals the European Commission set in the Europe 
2020 Initiative. However, a number of influential voices from the academia as well as from the 
practice have been suggesting that the current legal setting does not sufficiently respond to the 
challenges of big data. Based on the approach that follows the traditional dichotomy of laws we have 
identified existing legal barriers and enablers to big data reuse in the existing European legal 
framework. The analysis has shown the following: data protection law mostly acts as a barrier (aims 
at minimizing the amount of data that can be processed, prevents limitless retention, inflicts 
additional obligations on data reusers etc.). In rare cases data protection law can also act as an 
enabler, for example through the principle of data quality (an analysis of a more precise dataset 
would give more reliable results). Protection of human rights represents a barrier to data reuse, 
though a justifiable one. Human rights call data reuse into question when the latter is performed to 
follow the business objective regardless of the rights and interests of data subjects. Data localisation 
is an indirect barrier to data reuse. It deters international data transfers and therefore limits 
exchange and reuse of data on a global scale. By ensuring the data is available for additional analyses 
and examination in the future, data retention law acts as an enabler. Cybersecurity can be both, a 
barrier or an enabler to data reuse. If the requirements are too burdensome, then they deter 
processors from keeping the data and reusing it (barrier). However, by stimulating security those 
requirements can create a more trusted and secure environment that actually encourages data reuse 
(enabler). As regards the private law part, IPRs are barriers to data reuse when they limit data 
reusers to fully exploit datasets. They are enablers when they guarantee better legal protection and 
thus encourage authors to share their (IP protected) data. Competition law is a barrier when it limits 
a data owner that has a dominant position in the market. It is an enabler when it encourages fair 
competition. When data reusers reuse data to customize their marketing strategies and reach out to 
more clients, consumer protection law blocks those business conducts that are based on unfair 
practices (e.g. broadly defined purposes of data processing to enable easy contact with the 
costumers). On the other hand, data reuse can also be advantageous to consumers, when it (justly) 
helps achieve more precise and targeted advertising. In such cases consumer protection law takes a 
neutral position.   
Based on the findings above we can conclude that the EU regulatory landscape is highly complex 
when it comes to data reuse. Claiming that as a general proposition the EU law should be labelled as 
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a barrier or as an enabler does not hold much water. Nevertheless, identifying the most important 
barriers and enables for data reuse may be useful for further regulating data reuse in order to 
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